Italy’s media landscape is on the brink of a major shift. In this piece, we analyse how this acquisition could trigger the first use of the new EMFA tool to assess threats to media pluralism and editorial independence.
 
There are several reasons to be concerned about the impact of the announced sale of the Italian media group GEDI, currently being negotiated with the Greek media company Antenna Group. The first is that the Italian media system already shows relevant risks for media pluralism, as clearly highlighted by the results of the Media Pluralism Monitor.
Figure 1. Average risk per country, Media Pluralism Monitor 2025

The medium-high risk score for Italy in the Media Pluralism Monitor ranking stems from historical problematic features related to the concentration of the audiovisual market (notably, the “duopoly” RAI-Mediaset), political influence on public service media, and other structural factors. The situation has recently worsened due to the increase in attacks and SLAPPs on journalists, the weakness of the news business, and an increased political grasp on the PSM from the centre-right government.
In such a context, the ongoing negotiations between GEDI and the Antenna Group sparked further debate, especially after an extension of the exclusive negotiations by two months was announced in December 2025. GEDI group is the second player in the newspapers sector and the third in the radio sector, with 19.8% and 10.3% of the market revenue, respectively. In terms of audience, the GEDI radio outlets have 20.9% unique listeners on average, whereas GEDI daily newspapers’ share is 11.9% of total daily newspapers circulation. (AGCOM open data, year 2024). According to the latest data published by the Italian Communication Regulatory Authority (AGCOM), the two leading newspapers of the group – La Repubblica and La Stampa – rank 2nd and 6th in circulation, respectively, with a declining trend they share with other legacy newspapers.
Historically, La Repubblica had a liberal-progressive editorial line, impersonated by its founder Eugenio Scalfari, who served as editor-in-chief from 1976 to 1996, followed by Ezio Mauro, from 1996 to 2016. In the last 10 years the newspaper had a more turbulent governance and editorial leadership, following the ownership’s changes – from CIR (the holding of the industrialist Carlo De Benedetti) to Exor (the holding of the Agnelli family) – and the dire conditions of the media market, as narrated by Alessandro Gilioli, former journalist of L’Espresso, in an article significantly titled “A catastrophe’s chronicle”. Nonetheless, it still relies on (and talks to) a progressive public opinion, with a critical stance vis-à-vis the centre-right government led by Giorgia Meloni.
In this context, it is worth recalling the effects of the transition from CIR to GEDI on the Italian media market. The weekly magazine of the group, L’Espresso, which has been an outstanding media outlet engaged in investigative journalism and civil rights campaigns, was sold in 2022 to the owner of a football club (Daniele Iervolino, BFC media), which in turn sold it to Ludoil, an energy company, in 2023. Besides, at the local level, GEDI inherited a chain of media outlets active in many Italian regions, many of them being prestigious (Il Secolo XIX, Il Piccolo). All the local media have been sold off, with these dismissals contributing to changing the overall scenario of local media ownership, now characterised by a trend toward mixed ownership, in which the non-media undertakings are often related to sectors highly influenced by the (local) political power.
The second source of risk is the limited transparency of the ownership structure and the lack of information about the investment strategies of the acquiring company. Antenna Group is the media company of the Kyriakou family. As documented by a report published by “Associazione Stampa Subalpina” (local association of the main trade union of the Italian journalists), written by the Greek journalist Danai Maragoudaki and based on an investigation by the Solomon consortium, Antenna Group is controlled by the holding K-Group, based in Luxembourg and owned, whith 33.3% share each, by Theodoris, Xenophon and Athina Kyriakou (through their companies Praxis Global Investments, Altavista Global Holdings, Globecast Holdings).
The group was founded by their father, Minos Kyriakou, born in a family of prominent Greek shipowners and then founder of a media empire. The Kyriakou family’s conglomerate has 89 companies, most of which are registered in the Netherlands, Greece and Cyprus, and some in the Marshall Islands, Luxembourg, Ireland and the UK. It is active in shipping, finance, real estate, transportation, and media. The media assets, focused on television and radio, are distributed in 34 companies; it is among the main players in the audiovisual sector in Greece (with Antenna Greece, controlled by Antenna Group and legally registered in the Netherlands), and it is also present in Eastern Europe, the UK and Australia. The Maragoudaki’s report also confirms the business relationships of the Kyriakou group with Saudi Arabia. Since 2022 the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) has a share of Antenna Greece, through the media company MBC Group (Middle East Broadcasting Center). Theodoris Kyriakou, CEO of Antenna group, has close relationships with politicians, specifically with governments in Greece, the US, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
On 27 January 2026, the internal trade union in La Repubblica (Comitato di redazione, CdR) published the results of a journalistic investigation, pointing out the lack of transparent financial reporting of the acquiring entity in the last years, and raising concerns about the lack of experience of the acquiring group in the newspaper sector. “An analysis of the 2024 financial statements reveals a publishing business with no presence in print media, about one-third the size of Gedi’s. As for Antenna Greece Bv, it has not distributed any dividends in the last three years. Based on these figures, it does not appear that the Kyriakou family is able to finance its international expansion through its television business”. The CdR concludes that “It is important for everyone working in the Gedi group that, before carrying out any operations in Italy, the Kyriakou family provides effective transparency on its strategies by publishing all consolidated financial statements updated to 2025”.
Other reports also note that the Antenna group has no prior experience in the newspaper sector. According to press insights, it is particularly interested in the radio activities of GEDI, and in La Repubblica as a national newspaper. Those rumours have not been confirmed nor denied, but raised concern about the impact of the operation on employment, and future investment in news.
The third source of risk, highlighted by authoritative columnists (Bill Emmot, “Cosa garantisce la libertà ai giornali”, La Stampa, 13 December 2025) and by FNSI, the journalists’ union, is the impact of the operation on the editorial independence and the editorial line of the involved media outlets. The Ordine dei Giornalisti, the professional association of Italian journalists, asked the government to use the so-called “golden power” to impede acquisitions when they did not guarantee editorial autonomy and safeguards for the employment level.
In fact, the media is included among the sectors of “national interest” in the European Union and in the national framework for screening foreign direct investments. The Italian government stated that it is committed to monitor the operation to protect pluralism and employment; that the Antenna group offer is on the whole GEDI group, but that just some of its assets are considered “strategic. As regards the use of the “golden power” to intervene into the operation, the government stated that it is not possible to provide any comments on this, in the lack of formal notification of the operation. to use the framework for foreign direct investment to intervene in media market operations.

To address the risk of owners’ pressure on the editorial decisions, the internal union of La Repubblica proposed to establish a foundation designed to guarantee separation between the editorial activities and the commercial/business management, following governance models like those of Le Monde, The Guardian, etc.
 
Does the GEDI-Antenna operation require a media pluralism test?
In the Italian debate on the GEDI-Antenna case, so far, very limited attention has been paid to the possibility of applying the so-called “media pluralism test” to the operation, a new tool recently introduced in European law to safeguard editorial independence and media pluralism in the context of media mergers.
Art. 22 of the European Media Freedom Act requires that, in cases of media market concentration, a specific assessment be carried out to evaluate the impact of the operation on media pluralism and editorial independence. This assessment shall complement the competition law and be undertaken by a national independent authority, in some cases assisted by the opinion of the new European Media Board. Art. 22, like most of the EMFA provisions, entered into application on 8 August 2025. The GEDI-Antenna operation, if confirmed, could be finalised in the first months of 2026. The operation is, by no doubt, in the scope of Art. 22, so the question is: is the Italian regulatory framework ready to apply Art. 22?
 
Italian regulatory framework ready to apply Art. 22?
Art. 22 does not introduce direct obligations and rights on the media market actors, but imposes an obligation on the Member States to lay down in national law “substantive and procedural rules which allow for an assessment of media market concentrations that could have a significant impact on media pluralism and editorial independence.” At the time of entry into application of the EMFA, the majority of EU member states did not have a specific assessment for media mergers, with the competition authority being the only competent authority and the economic rationale, based on market power, being the only criterion of the assessment.
However, in Italy, a separate assessment of mergers in the media and communications sectors is required under Art. 51 TUSMA (legislative decree 208/2021). According to Art. 51(3)(a) TUSMA, the actors of the Integrated Communication System (SIC, a large aggregate including legacy and digital media, cinema, advertising, sponsorships) when involved in concentrations, acquisitions and mergers are required to notify the operation in advance to the media authority AGCOM a) in the case in which their turnover is above the thresholds set by the competition law, and b) in the cases in which their turnover is above 50% of the SIC or 20% of its sub-markets.
Based on these thresholds, the GEDI case does not seem to trigger the notification obligation, being the market shares of the group below those limits, both in the newspapers and radio market. However, Art. 51(5) TUSMA provides that the AGCOM intervention to assess the impact of the concentration is not limited to the cases in which the notification threshold is met. As a matter of fact, the national authority may proceed on its own initiative, or at the request of interested parties.
When it comes to the scope of the AGCOM intervention, it must be noted that the assessment under Art. 51 TUSMA is limited to prevent positions of significant market power detrimental to pluralism.
As such, it is debatable whether the Italian law on media mergers, reformed in 2021 to comply with the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Vivendi vs Autorita’ per le Garanzie nelle comunicazioni (C-719/18) fully complies with the scope and criteria set in art 22(1), and the elements to be taken into consideration listed in Art. 22(2). As noted by Vigevani et al. (2025), “under current regulations, the pluralism impact assessment established by Italian law does not explicitly include criteria referring to editorial independence as a distinct concept from media pluralism, and this does not fully comply with the criteria established by Article 22 of the EMFA”. A different interpretation argues that the Italian legal framework and the subsequent AGCOM guidelines are in line with the requirements of Art. 22; specifically, Manganelli and Mariniello highlight that the guidelines issued by AGCOM in 2024 to assess the existence of significant market power positions that could harm pluralism (Resolution 66/24/CONS), include market as well as audience parameters to measure the impact of media concentrations on media pluralism. In so doing, they add specific indicators related to dissemination and circulation to the “classic” criteria of competition law.
In this context, the GEDI-Antenna case will test the compliance of the Italian legal framework to Art. 22 EMFA.The acquisition, if successful, would not increase the market concentration – it could even decrease it, in case in which part of the group will be dismantled by the purchaser. However, it could impact editorial independence, as the new owner might want to change the editorial line and its positioning in the national and international political scenario. While the same could have been said for the previous acquisition – from CIR to Exor (or any media acquisition), the novelty is that a European law is now requiring an assessment of the consequences of media market operations on media pluralism and editorial independence, entrusting an independent authority to run it, and also providing remedies. It must be added that the independence of newsrooms from commercial and owner pressure is one of the key goals of the EMFA, and it is the object of other provisions (art. 6(2)), as well as of the European Commission Recommendation 2022/1634, which lists best practices to protect the independence of editorial decisions.
As a consequence, in enforcing the national law on media concentration, the Italian regulator might interpret it expansively, thereby including the impact on editorial independence as one of the elements to be considered when assessing its impact on pluralism, and therefore imposing conditions on the operation that respect editorial independence. On the contrary, failing to apply Art. 22 to an important merger would constitute an infringement of a European Union regulation; in this case, the European Commission may initiate an infringement procedure, and the obligation to lay down a new law on media mergers assessment would follow. One should also highlight the possibility for the European Media Board to step in the process, in two ways: it could be asked its opinion on the matter by the Italian regulator; or, considering the fact that the operation involves media companies based in several EU Member States, the European Media Board could draw up an opinion on its own initiative (Art. 23 EMFA).
The way in which Art. 22 EMFA will be interpreted and applied in the case of the change of ownership of the prominent Italian group GEDI is relevant not only for Italy but also for testing the implementation of the EMFA itself. Combining the existing national law and the criteria and provisions of the European regulation is, by no doubt, the shortest and easiest way to implement EMFA. As a precedent, the recent case of the acquisition of RTL Nederland by DPG Media can be mentioned. In this case, even if not obliged by the law, and before the entry into implementation of art. 22 EMFA, the Dutch competition authority, asked the Commissariaat voor de Media for advice, and the merger was approved by the competition authority, subject to strict conditions aimed at safeguarding media pluralism and editorial independence. In this case, it can be said that EMFA criteria were anticipated and taken into consideration by the competition authority in its merger evaluation. Alternatively, the lack of intervention and assessment by the AGCOM in the GEDI-Antenna case would lead to the conclusion that Italy is in breach of European law, and that the Italian legal framework on media market concentration must be reformed to comply with Art. 22 EMFA.
 
The analysis in this blog post was developed in consultation with the CMPF research team. The views and conclusions expressed are the author’s own.
References
1 art. 13 DPCM 179/2020, and art. 4 (1) Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union)
2 (Art. 22 and Art. 23 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU, European Media Freedom Act).

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